Conflict of Laws by Andrews, Fletcher R.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 3
1956
Conflict of Laws
Fletcher R. Andrews
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Fletcher R. Andrews, Conflict of Laws, 7 W. Res. L. Rev. 250 (1956)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol7/iss3/11
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
for the arrest of a violator of the "Sunday dosing law." The judge refused
to issue it. Relator then sought from the court of appeals a writ of manda-
mus to compel its issuance. The writ was refused and the Supreme Court
affirmed, 46 holding that since no legal right of relator had been affected
by -the violation of law, he had no beneficial interest which would sustain
such an action by him. This case has been discussed at length in a recent
decision in a prior issue of this review.47
SAMUE. SONENFIELD
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Federal Versus State Law
Three Ohio cases decided in 1953 but not reported until 1955 reiterate
the principle that federal law takes precedence over state law in matters
based upon the Constitution of the United States or the acts of Congress.
In State ex rel. Cutshaw v. Smith,1 the court applied the principle in
an extradition proceeding; and in White Cross Hospital v. Chesapeake &
Ohio Ry.,2 the principle was applied in connection with the interpretation
of a federal bill of lading.
While recognizing the principle as applicable to substantive law,
O'Leary v. Pennsylvania R.R.8 notes that in actions brought in state courts
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the law of the forum state con-
trols with reference to procedural matters. The particular question was
whether the trial court in its instructions to the jury might properly go
beyond the specific allegations of negligence raised by the pleadings, and
the court stated that this was a question of procedure and, consequently,
should be decided in accordance with Ohio law. However, the case is
weakened by the fact that there appeared to be no conflict between the
federal law and the Ohio law.
Although not an Ohio state court case, United States v. Acri,4 which
originated in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio, should not be overlooked. The case concerned priority between
the lien of an attachment and liens of the United States for taxes. The court
pointed out that the relative priority of the lien of the United States for
unpaid taxes is always a federal question and that a state's characterization
of its liens, while good for all state purposes, does not necessarily bind the
Supreme Court of the United States. Thus, the fact that the Ohio courts
had characterized an attachment lien as an execution in advance and had
"State ex rel. Skilton v. Miller, 164 Ohio St. 163, 128 N.E.2d 47 (1955).
" 7 W ST. REs. L. REv. 203.
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treated it as a perfected lien at the time of the attachment, did not bind the
Supreme Court, which held that for federal tax purposes the attachment
lien was inchoate.
Domicile and Residence
Although not decided by appellate courts, two cases in this area are
worth noting.
In Case v. Case,5 the court was asked to prescribe the proper method
for serving notice of the probate of a will on a young gentleman named
Richard, aged twenty, who, at the time, was stationed in Alaska in the Air
Force. Richard's home was in Wyoming, Ohio. Ohio Revised Code sec-
tion 2101.26(B) provides for such service by leaving the notice "at the
usual place of residence." The court held that service might properly be
made upon Richard by leaving the notice or a copy of it at his Wyoming
home. Since Richard was located temporarily in Alaska, and since his
permanent residence and domicile were in Hamilton County, his "usual
place of residence' was in that county, the court decided. But the court
also stated that the legislature did not intend the quoted phrase to be
synonymous with the word "domicile," but intended it to mean the place
where a person has his fixed permanent home and to which, upon leaving
for any temporary purpose, he intends to return. Yet, by definition, that
place would be his domicile. In this respect, as Yul Brynner sang in 'The
King and I," "it's a puzzlement."
The other case in the area is Spahr v. Powers,6 which involves what
is now Ohio Revised Code section 3503.05. That section provides, in
effect, that if a person attends an institution of learning located in a county
other than the county in which he had his voting residence immediately
preceding his attendance at the institution, his voting residence shall be
deemed to be at the place where it was located immediately preceding
such attendance. Interpreting this statute, the court held that the years
during which the particular students attended Antioch College in Yellow
Springs, Ohio, should not be counted toward the time required for the
establishment of a voting residence, even though the students remained in
Yellow Springs after graduation. The students came from outside Ohio.
As reported, the case is simple enough. However, the intriguing thought
1 70 Ohio L Abs. 243, 127 N.E.2d 633 (Ohio App. 1953).
'69 Ohio L Abs. 345, 125 N.E.2d 363 (Ohio App. 1953).
'70 Ohio L Abs. 133, 127 NXE.2d 877 (Ohio App. 1953).
£348 U.S. 211 (1955).
'55 Ohio Op. 317, 70 Ohio L Abs. 2, 124 N.E.2d 856 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1955).
* 57 Ohio Op. 50, 71 Ohio L. Abs. 121, 129 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1954).
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is whether the statute prevents a student from ever obtaining a voting
residence where the institution is located, even if he abandons his prior
home, has reached his majority (or is an emancipated minor), and intends,
while still in college, to settle in the college town.7
Res Judicata and Full'Faith and Credit
In Cleveland Trust Co. v. Kolar,8 the bank obtained a judgment against
Kolar in Ohio on a cognovit note, and subsequently brought an action in
Florida on the Ohio judgment. Kolar answered, in substance, that the
judgment was improperly entered, was null and void, and was of no force
and effect. The bank moved for judgment on the pleadings and for
summary judgment. The Florida court granted the motions and entered
judgment in favor of the bank. Later, there was a hearing in Ohio on
Kolar's petition to vacate the Ohio judgment. Her petition was based,
among other things, upon allegations that the judgment was taken for
more than the amount due and that the claim was barred by the statute of
limitations. The -bank contended that Kolar's answer in the Florida action
raised affirmative defenses similar to -those set forth in her petition to vacate
and that consequently all her rights with respect thereto were res judicata.
The court correctly held that the matters were not res judicata. The Florida
court merely entered judgment in recognition of its duty under the full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States.9 The
Florida judgment in no wise determined or affected any defenses which
Kolar had to the original Ohio judgment.' "
Substance and Procedure
There is nothing novel or startling in the proposition that matters of
substantive tort law are governed by the place of the occurrence and that
matters of procedure are governed by the law of the forum.? But the
unusual application of these doctrines justifies the inclusion of Griffin v.
Gar Wood Industries, Inc.,12 in this article. Griffin, a citizen of Kansas,
was injured in Kansas through the alleged negligence of a Kansas corpora-
tion, doing business in Ohio. Under the Kansas workmen's compensation
law, the plaintiff obtained an award, which his employer's insurance com-
pany paid. The allegedly negligent corporation was not Griffin's employer.
'See STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAws 29 n. 37 (2d ed. 1951).
871 Ohio L. Abs. 26, 125 N.E.2d 196 (Ohio App. 1955).
0U.S. CONST. Art. IV, § 1.
" The court then decided that Kolar's defenses were no good anyhow, and entered
judgment for the bank.
"See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 378, 585 (1934).
'297 Ohio App. 129, 123 N.E.2d 751 (1954).
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The Kansas workmen's compensation law permits the injured party to re-
cover from the actual tortfeasor even though he has-obtained an award,.and
sitpulates that if he does not bring such an action within a year, his cause of
action be automatically assigned-to the employer, who may enforce it.in his
own name or in the name of the workman. Although the year had passed,
Griffin brought an action in Ohio against -the Kansas corporation as the
actual tortfeasor. The defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings,
contending that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest. The trial
court sustained the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The court
held that Kansas substantive law governed. Thus, by reason of the Kansas
law, the plaintiff's failure -to bring an action within a year operated as-an
assignment to his employer of his cause of action against the defendant.
However, held the court, the enforcement of the right is governed by the
adjective-or procedural law of Ohio. Ohio Revised Code section 2307.05
requires that actions be prosecuted in the name of the real party in. in-
terest.'3 By the operation of the Kansas statute, the plaintiff's interest was
assigned to his employer. Consequently; the plaintiff -was not the real party
in interest and was not entitled to maintain the action.
Title to Personal Property: In General
Merely as a reminder of an established rule, I indlude the case of J. T.
Fish & Co. v. States Coal Co.14 The question was whether or not tide to a
coal mining machine passed by reason of a certain transaction. The parties
negotiated the purchase in West Virginia, and, although the location of the
machine is not given, it seems logical to assume that it was likewise in
West Virginia. The court held that since the sale was consummated in
West Virginia, the laws of that state must be applied.
Mofor'Vehicles: Title and Liens
The troublesome question of conflicting claims to an automobile
wrongfully brought to Ohio from another state, the claimants both being
innocent parties, is with us again in Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Guterman.15
It may be recalled that the pertinent part of Ohio Revised Code section
4505.04 provides that no court shall recognize the riiht, title, etc., of any
person in or to a motor vehicle unless evidenced by a certificate of tide
duly issued in accordance with the provisions of the applicable Ohio
statutes. In the Guterman case, Brady Motors owned a car in Illinois
and held an Illinois certificate of tide. The car was stolen, and the plaintiff
'The exceptions are not involved in the present case.
*' 70 Ohio L. Abs. 585, 129 N.E.2d 657 (Ohio-App. 1954).
97 Ohio App. 237, 125 N.E.2d 350 (1954).
19561
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
insurance company paid the loss and took an assignment of Brady Motors'
-itle. Thereafter, in Louisiana, the defendant bought the car in good faith
from a person who was not the thief and who did not purchase directly
from the thief. The defendant brought the car to Ohio and obtained an
Ohio certificate of title. In a replevin action by the plaintiff insurance
company a judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed. The court said that
at common law a person does not derive title or right of possession through
a thief as against the rightful owner and that the statute does not change
the common law rule under the circumstances of this case. The purpose of
the statute, viz., to protect ownership against fraud, would be frustrated,
thought the court, if the innocent purchaser for value were to prevail; and
Ohio might become a dumping ground for stolen cars. Moreover, the Ohio
certificate of title law has no extraterritorial effect and must be limited
to those persons in Ohio who are obligated to secure a certificate of title
under Ohio law; and an out-of-state certificate of title may be recognized
by Ohio courts. The rights of the plaintiff should prevail over the rights
of the defendant, who bases his right of ownership and immediate posses-
sion on a prior theft. The court distinguishes the important case of Kelley
Kar Co. v. Finkter,16 upon the ground that in that case the plaintiff did
not produce a valid certificate of title from any state. It is to be hoped that
eventually the perplexing problems in this area will be submitted to and
solved by the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Jurisdiction to Determine Custody
In Swope v. Swope,17 the Supreme Court of Ohio decided that in an
action for divorce and custody of minor children, a court may not deter-
mine an issue of custody of the minors where the service of summons on
the defendant is merely by publication, and neither the defendant nor the
children are within the jurisdiction of the court. Because of marital dif-
ferences, the defendant wife left the home, which was in Ohio, taking the
children with her, and later she and the children moved to West Virginia,
where they remained. In the husband's Ohio action for divorce and cus-
tody, the wife was served by publication. The case should be considered
with May v. Anderson,18 holding that, under similar circumstances, Ohio is
not required to give full faith and credit to the custody decree of another
state.
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